What’s next for Lebanon and the Middle East?

A new war in Lebanon has begun, but a dual focus on sub- and trans-national dynamics is required to understand what might come next in the Middle East.
Starting with the trans-national matters. On ‘April Fools Day’ this year a region-wide game of cat and mouse began between Israeli and Iranian decision-makers in the name of ‘security’ and ‘resistance’. Although the Iranians are no fools, it is now clear a trap has been sprung on them.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s goal has been to force the Iranians into a direct conflict with Israel and the United States by repeatedly striking at the heart of the Resistance Axis leadership.
Since the Israeli Air Force strike against the Iranian embassy/command complex in Damascus on April 1 that killed IRGC Quds Force commander, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the Axis has lost almost its entire senior leadership including the supreme leaders of both its key Arab regional allies, Hamas (Ismail Haniyeh) and Hezbollah (Hassan Nasrallah) and less significantly -paradoxically!- the president of the Islamic Republic (the exact cause of Ebrahim Raisi’s helicopter crash remains a source of speculation). 
This week’s aerial and ground offensive against Hezbollah personnel and positions in Lebanon tipped the balance.
Due to its ‘Unity of the Arenas’ doctrine that promises mutual assistance for axis members, Iran’s leadership was put into a very difficult position by the attack on Hezbollah.
They had three basic options.
First, give permission to Hezbollah to launch its arsenal of precision guided missiles, which have the potential to inflict real damage on Israel and are therefore the jewel in the crown of Axis deterrence. However, these are meant to be the final defence against a US-Israeli attack on the regime in Tehran and only to be used in desperate days.
Another option was to do nothing, call the bluff of Netanyahu and refuse to walk into his trap. However, this option meant reneging on the Unity of the Arena’s doctrine, which could fatally collapse confidence in Tehran among its Axis allies.
The third option was to reluctantly launch a limited ballistic missile attack on Israel in support of Hezbollah (and ostensibly in retaliation for the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil in July), similar to the one they launched on April 13. This would save face with its allies and hopefully restore deterrence vis-à-vis Israel.
This last option is what Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei chose.
Unfortunately, from an Iranian perspective, this second direct attack on Israeli territory on October 1 finally gave Netanyahu what he wanted – a green light and backing from the Biden administration to attack Iran, which seems imminent any day now.
This is the macro context of the Israel-Hezbollah ground war now raging in southern Lebanon. But nothing in the Middle East is so simple and ignoring sub-national complexities is always foolhardy.
Lebanon is an extremely complex political and strategic environment. Lebanese politics rests on a delicate consociational balancing act between the three main religious communities: Maronite Christians, who control the presidency (currently vacant), Sunnis who always provide the Prime Minister and the Shi’a, who retain the office of Parliament Speaker – a position held since 1992 by veteran (non-Hezbollah) Shi’ite politician, Nabih Berri.
The historically pragmatic Druze, led by Walid Jumblatt, are smaller demographically but are often critical in determining the balance of power.
Hezbollah and their Iranian patrons have, according to many Lebanese, arrogantly dominated both the Shi’a community and Lebanon as a whole since 2008, when they took Lebanon to the brink of another civil war to impose their power.
So, with this domestic context in mind, Hezbollah is increasingly isolated and vulnerable between the non-Shi’a Lebanese population who certainly have no love for Israel, but very little for Hezbollah and Iran either. The Party is also staggering from the loss of its influential leader Hassan Nasrallah and may therefore struggle to bend the Lebanese state to its will as before.
There are possibly two roads for Lebanon; which one is chosen by the majority of the communal power brokers in Lebanon will have major bearing on the wider conflict.
First, Lebanese may choose to show solidarity with the resistance and place faith in Iran’s increasingly brittle Unity of the Arenas. If the pro-Hezbollah/Syria candidate Suleiman Franjieh is appointed president, it means that this is likely the chosen path, and Lebanon will remain a devastated battle zone for the foreseeable future, insulating the Iranian leadership – as is its purpose.
If, however, the other main candidate, Joseph Aoun, is promoted to the presidency it may indicate that the Lebanese seek to prioritise the interests of the Lebanese state. Aoun is the commander of the Lebanese Army – the lone non-sectarian institution in Lebanon.
In the latter case, it could transpire that the Lebanese state sacrifices Hezbollah in order to strike a new bargain with western and Arab Gulf powers. This could involve in the first instance a stronger enforcement of UNSC Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 War and required the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces north of the Litani River.
It should be noted that since 2006, in parallel to Hezbollah-IDF antagonism along the border, the Lebanese Army has coordinated monthly meetings with the IDF and the international peacekeeping force, UNIFIL.
For Lebanon, much will depend on the influence Nabih Berri and possibly the Druze, who are increasingly turning against the Axis in all three segments of their community in Lebanon, Syria and Israel.
Considering the disarray in Hezbollah leadership in Beirut exacerbated by Israeli subterfuge and sabotage of communication equipment, it is conceivable that the Axis could lose its grip over Lebanon. In this case the equally disrupted and desperate Iranian leadership could lunge for a nuclear weapon to offset the loss of Hezbollah.
Any detection of this would trigger an immediate response from Israel and the US, which will set off different internal and external spirals of consequences for Iran and the region.
Where are the off-ramps to this trajectory?
The UN in its current form has proved over and again that it is impotent to enforce any de-escalation in the Middle East.
The US is beholden to preserve the Israeli state even as it propels the region towards catastrophe.
The Gulf monarchies for the most part are looking to their regime stability while busily playing their own quasi-colonial games in the horrendous killing fields of Sudan, Ethiopia and Yemen.
One crucial factor that is missing today in the region is the wise heads of Shaikh Sabah and Sultan Qaboos of Kuwait and Oman respectively. Both were almost always the backroom mediators who cooled things down in the region without anyone knowing about it.
Observation of this silent role was a defining feature of my six years in Muscat in 2013-19. Both died in 2020 and the inability to find mutually beneficial channels of de-escalation in the region has been discernible since.